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In Germany, small firrns are financed chiefly by  institutioni benefits almost exclusively the
small banks, which are grouped into two sys-  entrepreneur who would otherwise have been
tems: the savings banks (Sparkassen) and the  rationed out of the market. Banks benf-fit only to
credit cooperatives.  The government actively  the extent that overcoming such rationing brings
supports the financing of investments in small  them new business.  Therefore, subsidies are not
industry - especially business start-ups. Harm  exploited beyond an intended level.
explains how small firms are financed in Ger-
many.  - Harm points out that small banks, which are
part of a decentralized market structure, over-
Harm contends that small and medium-size  come imperfections in the financial market by
firms contribute a lot to the Germany economy.  building institutions that supersede the market
Small firms are not subject to the control institu-  mechanism.  The savings bank and credit
tions - such as supervisory board seats, proxy  cooperative systems have each developed an
votir.,,, and equity holdings - that shape the  internal capital market, not unlike those within
relationships between large firms and large  large banks operating nationwide. Only central
banks.  institutions participate in the domestic money
market, to place the system's excess liquidity or
Government prograns  - whether loans  to raise funds to cover the system's deficits.
from government banks or credit insurance from  Also, the funding programs of the government
subsidized credit-guarantee institutions - are all  banks can be seen as a refinancing mechanism
administered through the banking system. The  that especially helps small banks. The same is
government funds or insures selected projects,  true for rediscountable trade bills.
but the banks assume the role of the monitor and
credit analyst in return for compensation.  Harm stresses that the nonmarket means for
allocating funds have developed only to counter
The operations of government banks do not  market imperfections. Market incentives provide
have a subsidy component beyond profits  the framework for economic decisions.  The
forgone. Their loans carry low interest rates but  system is balanced to the extent that the scope
not to the extent that they allow profitable  for perverse allocation of funds is minimized by
arbitrage with financial investments. The  mandating joint decisions of potentially conflict-
subsidy associated with the credit-guarantee  ing parties.
The  Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  disseminates  the rmdings  of work  under  way  in the  Bank.  An objective  of the series
is to get these  findings  out quickly,  even if presentations  are less than fully polished.  The findings,  interpretations,  and
conclusions  in these  papers  do not necessarily  represent  official  Bank policy.
Produced  by the Policy  Research  Dissemination  CenterOUTLINE
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The purpose of this paper is to familiarize  the reader with the mechanisms  of financing  small
and medium-sized  industry in Germany. The main issue, however, is not merely size per se,
but it is the scope of control that banks can exert over their client firms in their monitoring
activities. The two papers on banks' relationships  with small  and large' industry  then symbolize
the altogether different scopes of control.
While the companion  paper on the relationship  between banks and large industry focuses on
the cliche view of German  banking, i.e. that banks own and control  industry, the purpose of this
paper is to  demonstrate how the banking system is involved in the financing of the larger
fraction  of German industry without  having  access to these means of control.  Hence, this paper
aims at dispelling the myth that the relationship  of a few large banks with a few large firms is
characteristic of German banldng.
We  will start out  in  iapter  two to  provide some statistics that reflect the degree of
decentralization  of German industry.  The chapter is supposed  to provide an intuition on the
nature of the banks' market, as it influences  the nature of the demand for financial services as
well as the organizational  structure  of the banking  system. It will be seen that the largest firms
contribute  about half of the revenues in the economy, and that moreover the corporate charter
allowing  for the said means of bank control is not very typical in Germany. This motivates  a
closer look at the nature of financing  of small industry.
in chapter three, we will focus on the government's support  of entrepreneurial  activity, which
explains to some extent the decentralization  of German industry.  We shall discuss  and analyze
the worldngs of  the two banks of the federal govemment, KfW and DAB, as well as  the
activities  of the state-wide  operating  credit guarantee  institutions. Chapter four will describe the
financing  of small firms in more detail, focussing  on the refinancing  of the lending banks.
On top of a literature survey, the research was supported by numerous interviews with
representatives  of the various banking groups, and managers  of different size firms.
See Harm (221.
12.  The industrial  environment of German Banks
When describing the structure of German industry, we mean to define characterstics of the
environment  - or the market - of German banks. Primarily, the banking system has to adapt to
this environnient,  although  it undoubtedly  also takes its share in shaping  the industrial  landscape.
First of all there is the issue of size. Germany's industrial landscape  consists to a large extent
of small firms - the so-called  "Mittelstand"  - which has obvious consequences  for the financing:
limited  or no access to capital  markets, greater transparency  of the firm's operations,  but greater
risks due to lacking diversification  and greater dependence  on management  skills.
The legal form of incorporation  is likewise important for the financing  of a firm.  German
"Kapitalgeselischaften'  feature  limited  liability,  while in "Personengesellschaften"  there is always
at least one investor liable with his private wealth. The "Kapitalgesellschaften"  are further split
into  AG's  (Aktiengesellschaftn) with  tradeable shares,  and  GmbH's  (Gesellschaften mit
beschrinkter Haftung), where the trading of the shares is usually restricted in the companies'
charters, and even if it is not, transfer of ownership is institutionally more difficult, as the
transfer has to be registered and publicly  announced.
2.1.  Size distribution
Every other year the federal ministry of economics  publishes revenue statistics  incorporating
all revenues liable for VAT.  The reporting firms are then assigned to various size classes to
yield a size distribution  of firms in the entire economy, as well as selected  industries or states.
Incorporating  for example some 2 million firms in 1988, the sample is more or less complete.
Table 1 is taken from the Statistisches  Bundesamt  [36], and shows that than half of taxable
revenues were sold by firms with revenues totalling less than DM 100 million:
Moreover, only half a percent of all firms accounted for 50% of taxable revenues, and as
there are economies of scale for loan officers in managing accounts, it means that significant
efforts of the lending departments  in the banking  system must be geared towards financing  small
firms.
Table 2 shows that this structure  of industry  is not a recent phenomenon,  but that the structure
was in principle similar in  1960 so that one can conclude that in the post-war  period German
banks faced an environment where a large number of small and medium sized firms sought
financing for their ventures.  This point is stressed in the beginning  of this essay, as analyses
of  the German banking system often focus on large banks in  their relationship with large
corporations, and the data above suggest that in terms of lending volume the market of the entire
industry can be as large as the market of only the large corporations, in terms of labor effort
spent on the credit analysis it must be a multiple.
2Table 1: Revenue  size distibution of German Industry  In 1988
size  clss  # of  Cumu.  Revenues  Cumu.
(in 000 DM)  firnms  Perc.  Qn DM Mil.)  Perc.
<  50  299,541  14.8  10,357  0.2
<  100  336,304  31.4  24,551  0.8
<  500  821,656  72.1  196,846  5.4
<  1,000  238,193  83.9  167,885  9.3
<  5,000  248,384  96.2  512,984  21.4
<  25,000  60,940  99.2  627,452  36.1
< 100,000  12,805  99.8  585,425  49.9
>100,000  4,011  100.0  2,129,802  100.0
Total  2,021,824  4,255,302
Source:  Statistisches  Bundesamt  t36, p.42]
Table 2:  Revenue  size distribution  of Germau industry In 1960
size  clss  # of  Perc.  Revenues  Perc.
(in 000 DM) firms  (in DM Mill.)
*  20  299,019  17.1  4,192  0.6
*  50  471,167  44.1  15,481  2.8
<  100  387,624  66.3  27,686  6.7
*  500  455,872  92.4  93,733  19.9
<  1,000  61,295  95.9  42,728  25.9
<  5,000  55,227  99.1  115,643  42.1
<  25,000  11,582  99.8  115,146  58.3
* 100,000  1,804  99.9  81,623  69.7
> 100,000  505  100.0  2:4,533  100.0
Total  1,745,095  711,031
Source:  Statistisches  Bundesamt  [371
2.2.  Legal  Incorporation
Recendy, the "Statistisches  Bundesamt"  also started  disaggregating  the revenue statistics
according  to legal incorporation  of the firms  in the sample. This is shown  in table  3:
3Table 3:  Size distribution  according  to legal Incorporation  in 1986
Form  of  # of  taxable  Perc. of  average
Incorporation  firms  revenues  taxable  size
(DM  Mill.)  revenues  (DM  Mill.)
Sole  proprietors  1,507,308  649,580  15.4  0.431
OHG  164,625  284,332  6.7  1.727
KG  86,883  1,036,550  24.5  11.930
AG  1,597  881,309  20.9  551.853
GmbH  227,612  1,169,254  27.7  5.137
Cooperatives  6,519  85,638  2.0  13.137
Parastatals  5,359  61,009  1.4  11.384
Other  21,921  87,630  2.1  3.997
Total  2,021,824  4,225,302  100.0  2.090
Source:  Statistisches  Bundesamt  [36, p.341
The  first three  entries  are the "Personengesellschaften".  As  soon  as a sole  proprietor  accepts
a partner  in his business,  the 5;m changes  to an OHG  (Offene  Handelsgesellschaft).  The next
development  is a KG (KommanditgLsellschaft),  where  some  partners  are liable  with their full
personal  wealth,  and others  only up to the amount  invested  in the firm Qimited  liability). The
KG is typically  chosen  as a corporate  form, when  the number  of partners  becomes  "large'.
Special  forms  of the KG are the  GmbH  & Co. KG, where  the only  partner  liable  with his  full
wealth  is a GmbH  and the KGaA  (Kommanditgesellschaft  auf Aktien),  where the shares with
limited  liability  are trided  on the stock  exchange.  The KGaA  is recorded  in the statistics  of the
AG (Aktiengesellschaft),  which  means  that as there is only a recorded  total of 1597  AG's, the
KGaA  cannot  be a popular  corporate  form.  Historically,  it was developed  in the mid 19P'
century,  when  a share-issuing  AG with limited  liability  had to be approved  by the Prussian
government.  The KGaA,  featuring  a fully  liable  partner,  sidestepped  the approval  process.
Table  3 is supposed  to convey  similar  insights  as tables 1 and 2, as the traditional  object  of
studies of the German banking system (see for example Cable [71)  - the AG - has according to
the figures  above  a "market  share"  of only slightly  more  than 20%. This is even  less than the
KG's, the GmbH's  or the sole  proprietorships  and OHG's combined. Of course,  this is not an
accurate  statistic  of "market  shares", as exports are not included  in the VAT statistics,  and
inclusion  of exports  would  certainly  increase  the relative  importance  of the AG,  but nevertheless
it wouldn't  change  the fundamental  insight  that any bank worrying  about market  share  cannot
afford  the luxury  of serving  only the large corporations  with p iblicly  traded  shares.
This notion was confirmed  in interviews  with bankers  from the German big three, who
traditionally  had these  large corporations  as their main  clientele,  and who in the last decades
4have made significant  efforts to penetrate the market of medium-sized  finns.  Another topic,
where the above statistic  is going to be important  is when we examine the often cited question
of the undercitalization  of German industry.  As the AG is the only corporate form with
publicly  traded shares, it is the only corporate form where the bankdng  system can influence  the
firms' capitalization. At this point these are not quite 2000 firms.
T7he  AG is also the only corporate form, which is required to have a Board of Directors,
unless the company has more than 2000 employees, in which case also the GmbH's and the
KGaA's need a Board to ensure labor representation  acco:'ding  to the "Mitbestimmungsgesetz"
(Codetermination  Law). Therefore, the means  of control that banks can exert over client firms -
-equity holdings, proxy voting, and Board mandates - are limited to a small number of fims.
2.3.  Govein  ee  structures  for smaU rfums
To be sure, there is a governance  option available  for firms where the Law does not manuate
a Board. This institution  is called 'Beirat".  Although  GmbH's and Personengesellschaften  are
not required to install a Beirat as a governing body aldn to the Aufsichtsrat  for the AG, many
firms acually make use of this institution. In a sample of 258 firms examined  by Richter and
Freund, 56% of the firms had such a "Beirat" [34,p.33]. 2 As the definition  of the authority is
entirely due to the corporate charter, the function of the Beirate ranges from pure consulting
institutions to institutions  with authority identical wO  that of a majority shareholder, 3 in which
case they perform mostly  a control and monitoring  function,  often even management  functions,
as in small firms the step from monitoring  to decision-making  is smaller than in large firms.
However, the consulting function of  the Beirat is usually more attractive to firms in the
Mittelstand, as they typically lack the financial freedom to install a  staff function next to
management. Richter and Freund [34] cite a study by Gaugler and Heimburger [19] which
found that 60% of the Beiriite  they examined  were installed  for consulting  purposes. Important
for this study was the finding that only 31 out of 492 Beirat members were bankers, which
suggests that there no  institutionalized  influence of  bankers over firms in  the Mittelstand.
Moreover, in those  cases that a banker was in the Beirat, it happened  in successful  enterprises,
which according to the study employs predominantly  Beirate with an advisory function.
What is  left of  our analysis is that the power of  banks does not reach directly to  the
Mittelstand.  While the figures in Harm [221 support the claim that the potential influence  of
banks over  the large AG's is significant, this claim cannot be made for the  small firms.
Nevertheless,  ft is true that tirough control of large corporations, the banks indirectly  influence
the fate of  small firms, as  they are at times very dependent on the policies of  the large
2Notably,  the firms with the worst performance  recorded showed  the least frequency  of Beirite.
3Westhoff  [41,pp.17- 201
5corporations,  such  as ther decisions  on the provision  of trade credit,  but the nature  and extent
of such  influence  is not known.
Our purpose  in bis chapter  was to show  that banks  lack  the institutional  framnework  to exert control  in the firms of the Mittelstand,  and that these firms  account  for nearly than half the
domestic  revenues  of the German  economy. We can now go on to discuss  the involvement  of the banking  system  to finance  these  firms.
63.  Official support for business start-ups  and smal  businesses In Germany
From the beginning  of the modem Germany  in the post-war  period, the German government
had  a  very  positive attitude towards the  development and  growth of  the  "Mittelstand".
According to Ludwig Erhard, this term does not stand for a collection of small and medii m-
sized firms, but for an "attitude in the socio-ecoinomic  and political process" [18,p.54], and he
referred primarily  to the fact that the firms in the Mittelstand  are owner-managed,  with the most
desirable  feature that the owvner  is fully responsible  and accountable  for his own decisions. This
is essentially  the philosophy  behind  the government  programs supporting  business  start-ups. We
want to show  in this chapter how the German  government  s -,ports  entrepreneurial  activities, and
how it makes use of the banking system to achieve its objectives.
3.1.  Statistical notes on entrepreneurial  activity
Statistics  of entrepreneurial  activity  are plagued by the inherent flaw that small changes  in the
definition of who counts as an entrepreneur can lead to large changes in the statistics.  The
broadest conceivable definition is  to  count any person registering as  self-employed  as  an
entrepreneur. This would include approximately  1.8 million  people or 8% of the German labor
force as self-employed. 4 Within the class of self-employed  people there are large fluctuations.
Hunsdiek  [25,p.53] shows statistics for Northrhein-Westfalia  that identify an average stock of
450,000 to 500,000 self-employed  people between 1973  and 1984, but a fluctuation  of between
110,000  to 200,000 with a net addition  of about 10,000  a year.  However, this statistic  includes
the infamous  housewife  selling  cosmetics  from door to door as well as owners of sizeable firms,
and thus has to be differentiated  some more.
Table 4 shows the changes in the numbers of registered businesses by corporate charter,
demonstrating  that 75% of the new entries belong to the group of sole proprietorships.  This
statistic  can be viewed  as a proxy for the market of entrepreneurs  that potentially  seek financing.
Of course, the statistics  do not reveal how many  exits and entries were acco-unted  for by one
and the same person, which can be deemed  especially  large for the sole proprietors so that the
actual market size is likely to be smaller.  There were nevertheless 13,000 altogether new
enterprises  in the course of 2 years, 6,000 being accounted  for alone by the GmbH's, which has
been commented  on before.
Another  interesting statistic  provided by Dahrem6ller  [8,p.98] is the net growth in the number
of firms contingent  on the number  of employees. Between  1977 and 1985, the number of firms
grew by 128,000  to 1.36 million, and was overproportionately  explained  by firmc vith between
2 and 20 employees, mostly by firms between 2 and 10 employees.  .his  stront,.y hints at a
conducive  environment  for small business  start-ups,  and we shall now  conci.ntrate  on the support
mechanism  for would-be entrepreneurs.
4See Hunsdiek  f5,p.36]
7Table 4:  Business dynamics In Northrbelu  Westfalia by form of incorporation between
1980 and 1982
Form of  # of fi:ms  exits  enLties  net
incorporation  in 1980  abs.  %  abs.  %  abs.  %
Sole prop.  360,076  70,535  19.6  74,865  20.8  4,330  1.2
OHG and KG  62,283  12,515 20.1  13,497 21.7  982  1.6
GmbH  36,070  8,029  22.3  14,462 40. . 6,433  17.8
AG and KGaA  501  7i  14.2  65  13.0  -6  -1.2
Othe-  5,797  976  16.9  1,365 23.6  389  6.7
Total  464,727  91,926  19.8  104,254 22.4  12,328  2.6
Source:  Dahremdller [8], based on a  special analysis of  the "Statistisches Landesamt" of
Northrhein-Westfalia  requested by the Institu fvur  Mittelstandsforschung
3.2.  The forms of government support
The title of this section mentions government support rather than support of the bankdng
system with a reason. The following  discussion  will explain the various government initiatives,
and  show that the banking system more or  less has  the role of a  medium to  bring the
governmental  benefits to the ultimate  recipient.  We will discuss three different mechanisms  by
which the government  see' s to foster entrepreneurial  activities.
First there are direct subsidies  to the enterprises  in question, which receive some  form of cash
benefits directly from the government  accounts, usually  from the state governments. Secondly,
there are massive  lending  programs for business  start-ups  and small businesses  by the two banks
of  the  federal government, the  Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau (KJW) and  the Deutsche
Ausgleichsbank  (DAB). It will be discussed, in how far their programs constitute subsidies  or
not, in how far the programs are helping the entrtpreneur directly, and in how far they are
helping the intermediary  commercial bank.  Thirdly, there are subsidies in the fonn of loss
guarantees  to credit insurance  corporations.
83.2.1. Direct subsidies to entrepreneurs
Ths state governments  have implemented  various schemes of support for young and/or small
enterprises.S The most common ones are
- interest subsidies, either by a  stte-owned  bank making loans carrying low interest
rates,or by actua reimbursements  of interest costs;
- cost reimbursements  for "desirable" investment  projects, typically costs in connection
with R&D and environmental  projects, and investments  in structurally weak regions;
- cost reimbursements  for consulting  expenses  in connection  with R&D and environmental
projects, occasionally  also for expenses  incurred for normal business  consultants  by small
enterprises.  The main programs for subsidies  for consulting activities to small firms,
especially business start-up consulting, are administered  by the federal government in
connection with various trade chambers  and guilds.
All the programs have in common that they virtually never restrict certain industries from
access to  them, but that access is limited by size according to revenues and/or number of
employees and frequently also by age of the applying firm.  Data on the magnitude  of these
programs were not readily available.  One has to  add here,  however, that a  number of
entrepreneurs do not apply for these programs.  The administering  agencies request detailed
follow-up information  to verify that the original intent of the project which was deemed worth
supporting  has actually been pursued.
Another  golden  rule of the government  programs is that when it comes to financing  a venture,
the government  makes sure that it never finances 100%, but that there is always private sector
funds involved, be it eq%ity  provided by the entreprenet'r, or loans provided by commercial
banks.  This also holds for financial  arrangements  to be discussed  below.
3.2.2. The banks of the federal government
After the war, the German government  founded  two essentially politically  motivated  banks,
the Kreditanstalt  fOr  Wiederaufbau  to administer  the American  aid for reconstruction  in Europe,
and the Deutsche  Ausgleichsbank  to assist refugees  and other people  that were unduly disadvan-
taged by the war in their efforts for economic  reintegration.
5Por a.  comprehensive list of various govermment  progmms to aid the financing of small businesses see Uppert
[31].
93.2.2.1. The Kredltansta8t  fdir Wiederaufbau
The Kreditanstalt fur  Wiederaufbau (Reconstruction Loan Corporation) was founded in
November 1948 to administer the use of the Marshals plan and GARIOA 6 aid,  which were
provided by the American  government out of a fear that economic  distress in Western Europe
could pull countries into socialism. 7 Also, the GARIOA  was granted by the Department  of the
Army by the military government in Germany starting 1946 "to prevent disease and unrest"
(Weisbrod [40,p.14J), which is to show that the origins of the financing of post-wa;' German
industry had only a very remote economic  motivation as we know it today.
Likewise, the use of the funds through the KfW in Germany was provided according to
standards that with all  likelihood would not be classified as  normal bank policies today.
Hernann  Abs [l,p. 2 0] recalled the decisions of those days: to produce a ton of coal cost
approximately  80 to 100 Marks, while Germany  was obliged by orders of the allied forces to
sell ihe ton of coal for 16 Marks.  Which banker today would take the attitude: "First produce
more, then we'll talk about the quality of the loans."
The KfW soon took a leading role in the financing of German industry, amounting to a
financing  of 15% of net real asset formation  in the peak year of 1950. Hermann Abs himself
[l,p.24] was aware that the workings  of the KfW did not represernt  the ideals of a free market
economy sponsored by Ludwig Erhard in those days, but they rither controlled the flow of
investments.  This is the perennial question of  the optimal mix between market and plan.
Undoubtedly it was the legal environment pushed through by  Ludwig Erhard that further
strengthened  the development  of the German  Mittelstand,  but without the massive  support  of the
KfW in the core industries and the financing of raw material imports in  1950 and 1951, the
small entrepreneurs of the 1950s  would most likely not have taken the initiative to the extent
they did.  These anecdotes from the beginning of the 'Wirtschaftswunder" demonstrate that
before one worries about programs that intend to avert rationing willing entrepreneurs out of
financial  markets, one has to make sure that people are willing to become  entrepreneurs  in the
first place.
Correspondingly,  the activities  of the KfW in its starting years were geared towards the large
institutions in the core industries, and were only substituted eventually by programs geared
directly to small enterprises, which now account for almost the entire lending volume of the
KfW to the German private sector. The other large programs of the KfW include the design and
financing  of projects in less developed  countries as well as the finarcing of exports.
'Govenment Aid and Relief in Occupied  Areas
7Although  himanitarian motivations  were with no doubt a driving force  behind President  Truman's initiative,
Senate  and Congress  approved  the aid bill only in 1948,  after the communists  had taken over Czechoslovak  ia, and
it was feared that the communists  rmight  also win in the Italian elections. According to a study by  the State
Departmeat, representatives  of the US Chamber  of Cemmerce  or from Wall Street  actually  opposed  the provision
of funds for European  reconstruction.  (Weisbrod [40,pp.  11  21).
10The 1989 annual report of the KfW [29] cites an oierall lending  volume of 112 billion DM,
half of which are classified as long-term investment  loans to foster the German economy.  A
number of these loans went to finance infrastructure investments  of the communal  administra-
dons,  but the majority of loans is geared towards investments of  small and medium-sized
enterprises.  The magnitude  can only be estimated by the published flow data: In 1989, loan
contracts to foster investments in the German economy amounting  to  16.3 billion DM were
signed.  Out of these 8.5 billion went to the Mittelstand,  including 1.2 billion for investments
with environmental  character.  The latter should not be counted as support of smal; business,
as the intent is to overcome  the extemnalities  associated  with pollution. Still, this means that the
Mittelstand accounts for 45% of domestic investment loans, and 28% of the overall lending
volume.
Only 1.3 billion DM of this lending volume was provided from ERP programs, the rest of
programs originated  by the KfW. One has to remember, however,  that the development  of KfW
programs was only made possible  by a decision  of the German government  to not have the ERP
funds paid back by interest and principal repayments  on KfW loans, but to repay them out of
the fiscal budget - a strong decision in favor of continued support of the German economy by
the KfW, which otherwise would have ceased to exist, or at least not have the size that it has
today.
The ERP program is predominantly  geared towards small industry. Loan applicants  are firms
with less than 200 employees  and less than DM 50 million in revenues.  The maximum  loan
amount is DM 300,000, the average DM 100,000.  For the KfW Mittelstandsprogramm,  the
limit is revenues of DM 500 million.  80% of the loans in the Mittelstandsprogramm,  which
accounted  for 40% of the volume in 1989  went to enterprises  with less than 50 employees. The
lending volume included 1700 loans over DM 460 million to business start-ups that did not
qualify for the ERP business start-up program.
An important feature of KfW operations  is the way in which  it involves the German banking
system. First, any program geared to the private sector is handled through the banking system.
The entrepreneur inquires at his housebank for KfW funds, and the housebank sends the
application  to the KfW.  Furthermore, the KfW makes sure that it is not financing the entire
amount of the investment  at stake, but that it only takes a share.  DM 7.1 billion in loans to
domestic enterprises financed  investments  of DM 17 billion, leaving the KfW with a share of
approximately  41  %.
KfW operations involve  all bank groups in Germany. The 1989  annual report [29] identifies
a shift away from the savings  banks and cooperative  banks towards the large commercial  banks,
with the three large banks accounting  for over thirty percent of KfW loans  in 1989. The savings
banks had for the first time dropped  below 25%, and the cooperative  banks to a share of below
15% in KfW loans.  Unfortunately,  these are not unbiased  statistics, as they refer to the entire
lending volume of KfW, and lending to the Mittelstand  accounts for only 40%, the rest being
loans to communities,  exports, and Third World development  programs.
11The DAB (discussed  below) cites the following  participation for the ERP business start-up
program in 1990:  Sparkassen  45.5%, Cooperative  Banks  37.1%, large banks 11.6  %, and others
5.8%.  This clearly hints at a dominant role for the small banks to finance business start-ups,
and suggests  at least a larger role of the small banks in the KfW's "Mittelstandsprogramm'  than
the allocations  for the overall KfW lending, although  arguably  not quite as much as the average
lending volume of the DAB is smaller as that of the KfW Mittelstandsprogramm  (see below).
The most important  feature of KfW lending  is that the default risk in the loans is borne by the
housebank, meaning that there is a decentralization  of the monitoring  effort.  Viewed in this
light, an important aspect of KfW operations becomes visible: the funding  program for small
firms is working like a refinancing  mechanism  for the banking system. This is a message  that
wants to be conveyed  in more detail in the next chapter: lending to small business is happening
to such a large extent in Germany,  because of the refinancing  mechanisms  in the banking system
that deviate from the ideal of a decentralized financial  market.
This brings up the issue whether  there are subsidies  contained  in the activities  of the KfW (the
same holds essentially for the Deutsche Ausgleichsbank  discussed below).  A subsidy is the
difference between the price that would be charged in a competitive  free market and the price
actually charged.  This theoretical definition breaks down once a competitive free market is
incapable of quoting a price for a good.  As we do not know how large of a problem credit
rationing would be in the absence of the various government programs to foster the financing
of small firms, it is hard to identify  the subsidies  contained  in the interest charged on loans made
by the KfW. Typically, the effective  interest rate on KfW funds ranges between 1.5% and ?.%
above the  discount rate,  which is  the  cheapest rate  available of  financing non-financial
enterprises, but which may not contain a subsidy  component, because the risk for the KfW is
limited to a default  of a commercial  bank so that in the reality of German banldng the loans are
de facto riskless.
The discussion  may focus on what is the correct riskless interest rate.  Although  the rates on
KfNW  loans tend to be marginally  lower than the rates on government  paper, interest arbitrage
is precluded by the fact that the debtor has to prove that the money has been spent on a real
investment  project. As the financing  of this project also includes  bank loans with higher interest
rates, the abuse of KfW funds for arbitrage transactions is severely limited'.  While in the
seventies  the interest rate on the cheapest official funds (the ERP funds for business start-ups)
had at times been at the discount rate, it was in the 1980s usually 1.5% to 2% above it, leaving
little room for exploiting subsidies  through arbitrage, or arguing that the g_ovemment  banks,
which receive  one percent less than the official  rate from the commercial  banks, grossly misprice
their essentially  riskless lending. Effectively, what the KfW program achieves is to lower the
cost of funds for small and medium size firms to a level that is comparable or even slightly
below that of large corporations.
gof course,  if the investment  financed  with an official  loan  is so profitable  as to pay off in economic  terms
before  the official  loan  matures,  the gains  can be invested  at slightly  better  terms,  net of the interest  rate nsk.
12Another means to measure subsidies  would be to look at the economic performance of the
KfW.  In 41 years of operations, the KfW has accumulated  retained earnings two and a half
times its capital.  This corresponds  approximately  to the devaluation  of the DM in 41 years, so
that also in real terms, the government  has not really lost money  with its investment  in the KfW.
One cannot say this about all govemment programs.  The facts seem to suggest that the KfW
has de facto performed  exactly like a non-p-ofit  organization  so that a subsidy  primarily consists
of profits foregone, but no more than that.
We may also look at the question, whether there is actually a subsidy to the banking system
inherent in KfW operations, i.e.  that the profits foregone by KfW are profits added to the
banking system.  Also there it is hard to speak of unreasonable  masses of wealth accumulated
by commercial  banks at the expense of the government  banks and ultimately  the taxpayer.  On
most programs, the loan issuing  commercial  banks receive a fixed spread of one percent on the
loan, while for some programs such as the equity substituting  loan the spread is only 0.4%.
This is much less than the customary interest spread earned by commercial  banks. The normal
interest spread, however, has to compensate  the commercial  barnk  for the interest risk inherent
in  maturity transformation, which does  not  apply for  the  loans passed through for  the
governmernt  banks, which are refinanced with matching maturities.  The spread then covers
credit risk as well as monitoring  and other operating costs, and 1  % is sufficient to cover the
default risk given a national insolvency rate of 0.7%, and banks average claim recoveries of
84% in bankruptcies.  The one percent spread will then surely cover the banks monitoring
expenses, but can in the absence of knowledge  about the banks marginal investments  be called
a subsidy to the banks.  Hence, the effects of the KfW (and in the same manner this is true for
the DAB discussed below) are predominantly  a mitigation  of the rationing of funds to small
businesses, with little if no price subsidies.  This corresponds to its economic role mentioned
by Hermann  Abs [l,p.25]:  "to concentrate  its activities  where commercial  banks can't or do not
want  to".
3.2.2.2. The Deutsche Ausgleichsbank
The Deutsche Ausgleichsbank  was founded in  1950 for the reintegration of refugees and
expeiled people from the formerly German territories in the East into the economic  process. It
had thus an almost entirely political motivation, although the role of the bank has changed
significantly  over the last decades.
Being a bank that provided refugees with business start-up loans, it was soon decided that it
should  concentrate  its resources more generally to the financing  of all business start-ups.  This
was again done with funds from the ERP endowment. Not long after its inception, the lending
volume from ERP funds exceeded  the lending volume associated  with refugees from the DDR
or Poland.
In  1988, the lending volume associated with this part of the original intent of the bank's
foundation  contributed  only 9% to the overall lending volume of DM 3.1 billion.  Almost half
13of this volume went to finance business start-ups, 9 with a notable DM 500 million in equity
substituting  loans, which are given for a duration of 20 years, enjoy a grace period of 10 years,
and are subordinated  to all other claimants  in case of a default.
The DAB is the main provider of official support for small entrepreneurs.  Its average loan
is about DM 70,000 as opposed to DM 260,000 for KfW funds.  In  1989 both institutions
combined provided DM 2.1 billion to finance almost 27,000 business start-ups.  As the DAB
finances only up to 50% of the applicable investment's costs, it is safe to assume a similar
leverage effect of about 150% as for the KfW, which means that both institutions financed
investments  of DM 5.3 billion for small business start-ups in 1989 alone.  It is thus without
question that both institutions  contribute a very significant  share to the fivancing  of the entire
market of business start-ups in Gennany.
The application  mechanism  and the risk-characteristics  of DAB lending are the same as for
the KfW and need no further mention here.  The only significant  difference is that the equity
growth due to retained earnings amounted to only 72% of capital in 40 years of operations,
which is less than in the case of the KfW.  There is thus more reason to argue that the lending
operations of the DAB enjoy a price subsidy than there was for the KfW.  However, this has
to be contrasted with the fact that the average clientele of the DAB is smaller and presumably
more disadvantaged  in financial  markets than the clientele  of the KfW. The ERP funds are also
available at a slightly lower interest rate than the funds from KfW programs.
Nevertheless, also the DAB did not operate with financial losses, albeit in real terms the
growth of equity  did not quite keep pace with inflation. In principle, however, the same analysis
holds as in the case of KfW: the existence  of price subsidies  is hard to prove or negligible  if we
exclude profits foregone from the analysis.  The main impact is again an increase in  the
aggregate  lending volume to the preferred sector: small business start-ups." 0
3.2.3.  The credit guarantee institutions
Besides the involvement  of the public sector banks, federal and state governments support
loans to  business start-ups and  small businesses with direct subsidies to  credit guarantee
institutions. In every state, there exists  at least one credit guarantee  institution  - often more with
each specializing  on a particular industry. The institutions  were founded  in the 1950s with the
motivation  that in the young  post-war  Germany  there were few people willing  to start a business
9Seo  Deutsche  Ausgleichsbank  [10,121
I°As a footnote,  we would  like to add that  when one compares  the growth of KfW  and DAB reserves with the
inflationary  record of the DM, one must mention  the extreme  monetary  stability  in the post-war  Germany.  All KfW
and DAB loans are carying  maturities  of 10 years, sometimes  more, and they include a prepayment  option with
no premium  charged  for it. It must be clear that the extent  of governnent programs  through  the KfW and the DAB
would  have taken  a completely  different form in an inflationary  enviromnent.  In this sense, monetary  stability  was
a key prrquisite  to the German governments  Mittelstandsprogramm.
14that at the same time had real estate property that they could offer as collateral for bank loans.
Hence, they were founded with the explicit goal to overcome credit rationing due to banks
insistence on collateral lending, and are an explicit instrument of the German government's
Mittelstandspolitik"  to sponsor business start-ups.
3.2.3.1. The structure  of credit guarantee institutions
The credit guarantee institutions  are all chartered as a GmbH, where the capital is provided
usually  to a little less than 50% by banks and Sparkassen,  and the rest by guilds from all sorts
of trades, and trade chambers.
They are non-profit institutions  (they pay no dividends)  and are tax exempt.
The guaranteed amount covers no more than 80% of the loan amount for a maturity of no
more than 23 years and a maximum  loan amount of DM 1 million.
They are banks according to the KWG (Kreditwesengesetz)  and have to follow the there
defined  rules for minimum  equity  requirements. To increase  their business  volume, they receive
an equity like loan from the ERP funds.' 2
Federal govemment, state governments,  and the ERP fund reinsure the losses of the credit
guarantee  institution.  In Hamburg, this is split with 42% for the federal government,28%  for
the state government, and 12.5% for the ERP funds, where the claims against the latter are
netted with its interest claims.' 3 Hence, the credit guarantee institutions receive at least 70%
of their losses from delinquent loans, which federal and state laws classify as a subsidy.  The
credit guarantee  corporation charges  an initial 1% on the loan amount, and 0.5% a year for the
insurance.
The application  procedure for a credit guarantee  originates at the housebank, which informs
its loan applicant that it cannot make a loan without the reinsurance. The application is then
forwarded to the loan approval committee  of the credit guarantee institution, which consists of
bankers as well as industry/trade  experts.  The entrepreneur  can also make use of consulting
expertise in the trade and industry chambers with experts from his own field that advise him.
I introductory  note by Helmut Haussmann  to the annual report of the federal  umbrella  organization  of credit
guarantee  institutions  [20].
12The ERP funds are classified  as loans although  they share all the characteristics  of equity. Obviously,  in a
non-profit  institution  the distinction  blurs.
"See Bilrgschaftsgemeinschaft  fur Industrie,  Handel, und Verkehr GmbH [5].
15Obviously  it is made sure that no potential  competitor  has a seat on the loan approval  committee,
but there is a theoretical  potential for abuse of the position in the committee." 4
It is worth mentioning  that entrepreneurs  sponsored by the credit guarantee institution often
get support from all three institutions  discussed  in this section, as loans from DAB and/or KfW
may also be insured by the credit guarantee  corporation.
3.2.3.2. Business Volume and Loss Experience
Between 1979 and 1989 the annual guarantee volume of all guarantee institutions  amounted
to approximately  DM 500 million," the stock of guarantees increased from DM 1.5 to DM 2
billion.  58%  of  the  volume was applied to  business start-ups or  take-overs of  existing
businesses, in numbers about 2,400 a year.  Most of the rest of the volume is guarantees on
loans to existing business clients so that they could be classified as follow-up loans.
The average loan amount amounted to about DM 200,000 per business, stressing  the focus
on small to middle sized  business start-ups. Recently,  a program was started  to guarantee  equity
investments  from Beteiligungsgesellschaften  (somewhat  like mutual funds, but not investing  in
the capital market), with a guaranteed equity volume of now DM 60 million.
The loss experience  between 1984  and 1988  averaged  approximately  DM 38 million  per year,
or about 2% of the guarantee volume.  From the business volume figures above, the fact that
the average  guarantee  amount is 70% per loan, and from the guarantee  pricing given above, we
can deduce that the revenues associated  with the guarantees are a one time fee of  1  % on a
volume of DM 700 million  in loans per year, and 0.5 percent per year on a stock of on average
DM 2.5 billion in guaranteed loans, totalling approximately  DM 20 million per year or about
50% of the losses, which makes the subsidy component  apparent.
3.2.3.3.  Who receives the subsidy?
In the beginning of this section, lets ask the question, why a bank would wish to invest in a
non-profit credit insurance institution that does not pay a dividend.  There must be some
advantages to the banks to justify this kind of investment.  From the balance sheet of the
14One  manager  of a credit guarantee  institution  recalled  in an interview  three instances  of a member  of the loan
approval committee blocking loan applications  of potential competitors in the history of the institution. The
respective  member was immediately  removed from the committee. One may not forget that the bankers on the
committee  always  have an incentive  to make a good loan, and are thus a powerful  counterbalance  to the abuse of
the position  by an owner of a potentially  competing  business.
''The following  figures  are taken  from the 1988/89  annual  report of the federal  umbrella  institution  of all credit
guarantee  institutic s [201.
16Hamburg credit guarantee institution  [5l we can compute  that the ratio of total guarantees  given
to total equity' 6 is about 15.
As the banking system is participating in the equity to only one half, the other half being
provided by the trade chambers and guilds, every DM given as equity by the banking system
results in DM 30 in additional  guarantees, which with a factor of 70% is equivalent to DM 42
in guaranteed loans.  Lets take a hypothetical  example  of an uncollateralized  KfW loan of DM
42 on which the bank earns Pf 42 (1%) a year.  With a 2% loss experience of the credit
guarantee institutions, the bank would expect to lose Pf 84,17  but be reimbursed Pf 60 (70%)
by the insurer, yielding an expected result of 18% before monitoring  costs.
Table 5: Expected proritability of a DM 42 Insured loan vs. a collateralized loan
insured  collateralized
loan  loan
Interest spread  Pf 42  Pf 42
Expected  gross loss  Pf 84  Pf 30
Insurance coverage  Pf 60
=  frnom  llateral  Pf 24
Expected yield  Pf 18  Pf 36
The insured loan is compared with a fictitious  collateralized  KfW loan of equal amount. The
loss experience is based on an economy  wide bankruptcy  frequence of 0.7% (where it is not
clear that the KfW sample has the same characteristics)  and an average retrieval of 84% of debt
obligations by banks in bankruptcies  through their collateral. 18 It is clear then that the bank
would always prefer to make a collateralized  rather than insured loan, all other things being
equal.  The officially insured loan, however, carries two advantages for the bank: first, the
guilds  and industry  experts  are providing  free consulting  as well as part of the monitoring  during
the life of the loan so that monitoring  costs are lower for the banks.  Secondly,  the bank profits
from the follow-up  business of the newly established  business relationship.
It  is then not unlikely that the bank would be marginally indifferent towards making a
collateralized  loan to an established  client vs.  an insured loan to a newly established venture.
l'Totad  equity consists  of capital plus capital surplus  plus profit reserves
17Banks'  claim retrieval rate on uncollateralized  loans in bankruptcies  is with 5% negligably low (source:
Gessner [211).
'5 Found  in a sample by Gessner (19)
17If the net result of the subsidy  is new clients entering  the market which  otherwise  wouldn't have,
while leaving the banks indifferent  to alternative investments,  the subsidy is justified.
The question  remains, however, why there needs to be a subsidy  at all. If the credit insurance
institution  would charge a I % fee for its services, it would almost break even.  The choice in
favour of the subsidy is obviously related to the price elasticity for the entrepreneur's loan
demand, and we have to look at the pricing mechanism  o'  the credit guarantee.  When the
entrepreneur  has no sufficient  collateral  to offer for his loan, the bank informs him that he needs
to  apply for a loan guarantee, and adds the costs of  the guarantee on  top of  the already
negotiated interest rate.. The tae charged by the credit guarantee institution is an account that
only flows through the bank
This means that the major cost of the loan guarantee to  the banks consists of foregone
revenues for the marginal projects where the entrepreneur  rejects the insurance premium, and
the bank rejects to lend without a guarantee.  One banker of a credit guarantee institution told
this author that the pricing of the guarantee was purposefully chosen with 0.5% on the loan
volume, because it was not viewed as a significant  cost component. 19 The one time fee of 1%
is anyway  no significant  deterrent, because  in reality few small businesses  consider  a loan's agio.
Hence, the pricing was chosen conciously  at a level where the price elasticity is almost zero,
which then necessitates  the subsidy.
In this situation, a bank will propose a loan to be insured as soon as there is a reasonable
chance for acceptance by the loan committee of the guarantee institution, but then half the
monitoring  effort is transferred to the non-bank  members  of the loan approval  committee. With
the numbers of table 5, this may in fact be the decisive  argument for a bank to invest in a credit
guarantee  institution.
Although monitoring the loan during its life is the responsibility of the bank, it is often
mentioned 20 that the detailed advisory efforts prior to the businesses inception ultimately lead
to the relatively low failure rate of 2% in the credit guarantee institutions' loan portfolios.  To
the extent that banks rely on trade chambers and guilds to provide consulting services to the
entrepreneur, the bank actually exploits an externality.
This reasoning essentially meant to show that the subsidy of  the government is mostly a
subsidy to the entrepreneur by providing access to otherwise unavailable funds (which is not
really a subsidy, but correction  of a market imperfection). The bank's return is largely due to
the extemality  stemming  from the capital  and know-how  provided by trade chambers  and guilds.
As they are financed by membership  fees from the entrepreneurs, the entrepreneur ultimately
pays for the costs of the services provided to him, the banks capturing the value added.
19In  the absence  of government  guarantees,  the credit guarantee  institutions  would  have to charge  approximately
2% for their insurance  with -resumably  non-negligible  effects on the loan demnand.
20Albach  [2,p.91
183.2.4.  Performance of supported vs. non-supported entrepreneurs
To analyze the success of governrient support programs for small businesses,  Unterkofler
138] examined a  sample including 635 firms supported by the state of Baden-Wfirttemberg
(excluding  federal support trough the KfW and DAB)  and 420 firms that started without official
support.
What was to be expected, is that the non-supported  firms had about 50% more equity when
they started out, showing  that the programs were actually applied to individuals  with less wealth
according to program intentions. However, the numbers also show  that the non-supported  firms
experienced  a significantly  higher profitability  in terms of return on equity and profits as percent
of revenues. This is not necessarily  an argument against the official support programs as they
are not supposed  to subsidize  the projects that promise good economic  results from the start, but
should  rather support the marginal  projects. In this sense the data from Unterkofler  suggest that
the official programs in Baden-Wiirttemberg  were applied to the intended audience.
The ultimate success criterion is the survival rate of the sponsored  businesses.  Unterkofler
cites a survey by the Landeskreditbank  Baden-Wurttemberg  that shows a failure rate due to
insolvencies  of 1,418 supported  businesses  of only 1.8% in the first 6 years of operations,  which
corresponds  closely to the loss experience of the credit guarantee associations. Yet, it is hard
to find a comparable  statistic  of the exit rates of non-supported  businesses.
In  a  sample of  194 firms founded between 1973 and  1981, Hunsdiek and May-Strobl
[26,p. I I1] found an exit rate of 17% until 1983. At the other extreme, the total insolvency  rate
in the entire economy  is 0.7% of all firms regardless  of age (Mortsiefer [33,p. 150]). As 75%
of all insolvencies  are usually accounted for by firms younger than eight years old, and they
account  for significantly  less than 75  % of the population  of all firms, it should  be safe to assume
that the failure rate of any new business lies above 2%, hence that the governmental  business
support can be deemed successful  in that respect.
On top of the quantitative  data, the sample by Unterkofler  contained  48% of the respondents,
who said that they would not have founded  their business without  official  support, and only 6%
said that in hindsight  they thought  that they could have  pursued their ventures with no problems
without  the official  support  programs. In conclusion,  the data suggest  that the official  programs
meet their goal of overcoming financial  market frictions, and that there is no evidence that any
institution  or set of institutions  captures the value of the subsidy without  at least contributing  to
the goals of the programs that may carry a subsidy in the form of costs to the public sector: to
eliminate market imperfections  in the financing  of small and young businesses.
3.2.5.  The financial structure  of new ventures
Unfortunately,  there are no complete  statistics  on the financing  of new ventures, as there are
no complete  statistics on business start-ups because  of the said definition  problems.  However,
19there have been some surveys at the Institut fur Mittelstandsforschung  that give some idea on
the financing  of new enterprises.
Albach, Hunsdiek  and Kokalj [3l quote a few studies with samples from the trade chambers,
the Institut fUr Mittelstandsforschuig  and the Ifo-Institut, that suggest that about 50% cf all
entepreneurs quote their demand for capital below DM 30,000.  Only about 15% had a capital
demand of more than DM 100,000.  If we contrast this with the average loan amount of DM
63,000 of DAB start-up loans, an average loan amount of DM 200,000 on loans insured by the
credit guarantee  institutions,  and an average loan amount of DM 260,000 for the business start-
up loans of the KfW Mittelstandsprogramm,  it becomes  clear that the official support does not
reach the very smallest  entrepreneurs. At the same time this means that with 27,00021  financed
new ventures in 1989, the official  programs hold a significant  market share in their size bracket,
possibly more than 50%, although the exact number is subject to speculation.'
This is supported  by a more detailed study quoted  by Albach, Hunsdiek  and Kokalj [3,p.431,
which included  a sample  of non-supported  businesses  with starting capital of about DM 60,000
that were financed with 85% equity, and the  rest bank loans, and a  sample of  officially
supported  businesses  that had an average  starting capital  of DM 300,000 and were financed  only
to 15% through  their own funds, another 18% through  outside equity,'  almost 50% loans from
official programs, and the remaining 17% from bank loans.  The same authors quote nnother
study with a  sample of 456 firms, in  which they found 25% firms with  official support
programs, but 34% of the sample  financed  itself completely  with own funds, and was thus likely
to be very small so that the officially  sponsored  firms made again almost 40% of the rest of the
sample, which may still have included smaller firms than those with official support.
At the end of this chapter, we would like to again make a reference to Table 1 above.  The
small and medium  sized firms contribute  a large share to the entire German economy, and this
chapter meant to show that if is hard to overrate the importance  of official support programs as
a determinant  of this economic  structure. Credit rationing  is a major deterrent to business  start-
ups in the real world of finance. If we exclude the very smallest  firms from consideration, as
there is no demand for outside  capital and they tend to be financed  to virtually 100% by owners'
2tTbis  number  is overfated  as it includes  double  counting. There are three entrepreneurial  programs  at DAB,
which  can be applied simultaneously  to the financing  of one new venture. As we showed  above that KfW and DAB
los  are only refinancing  means for the housebank,  it is conceivable,  and according  to a representative  of a credit
guarantee institution  quite common  practice, that loans refinanced by KfW and DAB are insured by the credit
guaantee institutions.  Hence, the true number  of officially  supported  entrepreneurs  could range anywhere  between
15,000 and 27,000.
22Albach  12,p. 91 estimas  that  80% of all entrepreneurs  receive  official  assistance  amounting  to more than 50%
of the stating capital. However,  he does not quote a source for the composition  of the sample that these  figures are
based on.
2This sample  mu  'te biased towards finns that received money  from Beteiligungsgesellschaften  (investment
firms), as they do not play a predominant  role in the entire economy.
20funds,  the official  programs  cater successfully  to the needs  of the smallest  finns with  significant
demands  for external  financing. Although  no detailed  statistics  are available,  it is that the
market  share of official  programs  to finance  entrepreneurs  with capital needs between  DM
50,000  and DM 500,000  may  exceed  50%.
Although  they are based  on extensive  government  involvement,  the existing  programs  do not
contradict  the market  idea, as virtually  no program  favors  or restricts  a particular  industry,  all
programs  are based on the concept  of cofinancing  rather than complete  financing,  and all
programs  operate through  the banking  system  with the banks still being responsible  for the
monitoring  of clients  and to a large  extent  also  for their  selection  in the first  place. There  is no
evidence  that  incentives  exist  for the  banking  system  to grant  loans  to unpromising  ventures  only
to exploit  existing  subsidies. To sum  up, the govemment  programs  are based  on a philosophy
of supporting  market  developments,  but without  leaving  the development  of small  businesses  to
chance. They  efficiently  counteract  existing  financial  market  failures.
214. Issues in the  rwancing of smaU firms
In this chapter, we want to address some  issues pertaining  to the market environment  of banks
that finance small firms.  Due to the historical  evolution of the German banldng system ,the
major sections  of the banking system all had their specific  clientele of firms, and there was less
competition  between the banks than the number of different institutions might suggest.
The big three banks were always competing  for market share in lending to the large industry,
the savings banks (Sparkassen)  and credit cooperatives  were competing  at the lower end of the
firms' size distribution, and the regional banks had their main clientele in the group of larger
regional  businesses,  competing  at the upper  end of the scale with the big three, at the lower end
with  the  savings banks and  credit  cooperatives.  Competition only  started  to  intensify
significantly in  the early  1960s, but still no  firm could switch housebanks instantaneously
according to price signals. The decision of a firm to change housebanks  is a major alarm signal
for the other bank that receives  the loan application,  which  perpetuates  the strength  of the bank-
client relationship.
Competition happens rather with one firm financing itself through different banks, which
allows some flexibility with respect to the choice of banks, and obviously it happens in the
market for new ventures, as they haven't chosen a  housebank  yet.  Every banker that was
interviewed  in the course of this project stressed the commitment  of his bank in the market for
entrepreneurs to secure a larger market share, although one banker admitted that the large
number of information  seminars for would-be-entrepreneurs  had more of a public relation effect
than an immediate  consequence  in terms of profitability  and market share.
This only goes to show that despite growing increased competition  since the early 1960s, the
market structure has not changed significantly  in the past three decades.  In the following, we
would like to provide some information  that essentially verifies the market segmentation  with
respect to the financing  of small firms, and we would then like to stress the importance  of the
mechanisms  of refinancing of the small banks, which is pivotal to the large scale financing  of
small firms.
4.1. Market segmentation: smal  banks finance smal  rwm
Following a recommendation  by the Federal government in  1969, the bank associations
publish end year totals of business loans outstanding  that do i.ot exceed DM 1 million to any
single firm.  This is not necessarily the best proxy for lending to small firms, as some large
firms draw loans of less than DM 1 million, and some firms would have loans from many
banks, and hold a balance with each bank of less than DM 1 million.  Nevertheless, it is the
only statistic  available to estimate the extent of bank lending to small firms.
Bannock [4] compiled  the data in table 6 from annual reports of private commercial  banks,
savings  and giro bank associations,  and unpublished  data from the association  of Raiffeisen-  and
Volksbanks. The data on total advances to businesses  originate from Bundesbank  publications.
22It must be clear that part of the relative decline  in the share of bank lending to the Mittelstand
is significantly  due to the relatively  large inflation  in the 1970s  and the constant cut-off measure
of DM 1 million.  Using able  1 above, we can put the relative volume of bank lending to the
Mittelstand  in perspective with the share that the Mittelstand  contributes  to domestic re'v-nues.
Table 6: Bank lending to the Mittelstand compared to total bank lending in the  1970s.
(Amounts in DM billion)
Year  Total bank  Bank  advances  Percent
advances to  to the Mittel-  of total
Businesses  stand
1970  216.7  95.6  44.1
1971  252.7  104.2  41.2
1972  297.3  119.6  40.2
1973  324.3  125.7  38.8
1974  $45.9  133.3  38.5
1975  352.6  116.2  33.0
1976  380.5  130.7  34.3
1977  406.2  122.2  30.1
1978  436.9  132.9  30.4
1979  488.1  151.3  31.0
Source: Bannock [4,p.239]
Data from the Deutsche  Bundesbank  t14] suggest that across all examined firms (74,000 in
1980)  the ratio of revenues to debt liabilities  excluding  accounts  payable  is approximately  400%.
This means that the frmns  included  in Table 6 should have revenues not far in excess of DM 4
million,  which  in Table 1  accounted  for approximately  20% of domestic  revenues. This suggests
that the Mittelstand  is financed  overproportionately  through bank advances.
Furthermore, the share of the different  kinds of banking  ifistitutions  is represented  overpropor-
tionately  by the sma3l  Sparkassen  and cooperative banks, which is shown in table 7.  As the
central institutions  of the Sparkassen  and the cooperative  banks concentrate  their lending  volume
to larger firms, and leave the smaller business to the individual  savings  and cooperative  banks,
it becomes clear from table 7 tiat the cooperative  banks concentrate most on lending to small
firms, followed by the Sparkassen, and finally the commercial  banks, which include also the
smaller regional commercial banks.  All mentioned bankdng  groups have a higher share in
lending to  the Mittelstand, as private bankers, mortgage banks, hire purchase banks, and
branches of foreign banks all virtually do not lend to the Mittelstand.
23Table 7: Shares  of banking groups In total business  and lending  to the Mittetand  in 1979
Bank  type  share  in total  share  in lending
business  to Mittelstand
Commercial  banks  21.4  30.7
Savings  Institutions  38.3  35.7
of which:  Central  Giro  16.4
Savings  banks  21.9
Cooperative  banks  14.6  33.5
of which:  central  inst.  4.1
Credit  coops  10.5
Source:  Col.  1 Hennings  [23,p.51];  Col.2  Bannock  [4,p.246]
As the central  institutions  of the cooperative  and savings  banks  do virtually  not lend to small
firms,  the  data  support  the statement  that  small  firms  are predominantly  financed  by small  banks.
4.2. The refinancing  mechanism  of small  banks
In the ideal financial  market,  the economic  agents direct their own surplus  funds to the
investment  projects  with the most  promising  risk-retumn  characteristics.  It is predominantly  the
lcing  information  processing  capacity  of individuals  that effectively  puts  a limit  to the optimal
portfolio  choice  under  uncertainty,  and the banking  system  as a set of speializing  agents  is in
and of itself sufficient  proof  for this statement.
Yet, this may not lead us to infer that the banking  system  as a set of specialists  is not
constmined  by the limits  to information  processing  capacity. A cooperative  bank  operating  close
to the Danish  border  will most  likely  not be in a position  to judge, whether  the loan portfolio
of a Sparasse in Munich  shows  risk-return  characteristics  that  justify  an interbank  loan to that
institution  rather  than financing  the marginal  real sector  investment  in its own neighborhoods.
When  the banks  themselves  face  the information  problem,  the theoretical  problem  lies in the
choice  of an institutional  arrangement  for the refinancing  of the banks  between  the extremes
of a fully  decentrid  interbank  market,  and a centralized  refinancing  institution. We shall
show  below  that in Germany  the system  is - more  than in the US or the UK -tilted towards  the
second  alternative. Banks  are not so dependent  - in comparative  terms - on private savings and
funds  borrowed  from a decentralized  interbank  market  to finance  their loans.
2'Thi bang a dimect  consequence  of banks'  costly  information  gathering  (montoring)  activities.
244.2.1.  Rediscountable  trade-bills
Usually,  the cheapest  means  of refinancing  are the rediscountable  trade  biUls,  of which  there
are two types  in Germany. In the first case, the purchaser  of a good  receives  a trade bill over
the amount  of goods  sold  from his supplier  and sells  this trade  bill to his bank,  which  can then
rediscount  it at the Bundesbank.  In this case, the trade  bill is effectively  only credit insurance
by the supplier  and only  appears  as an off-balance  sheet  item  in his statements.  Alternatively,
the purchaser  issues  a trade bill to the supplier,  who in turn hands  it to his bank. The first
method  carries  the advantage  for the purchaser  that he can still deduct  the cash discount,  if
offered.
Thus, the only institution  that provides  liquidity  in this transaction  is the Bundesbank  itself.
This was made  Bundesbank  policy,  as it was argued  that the resulting  increase  of the money
supply  would  be directly  linked  to a flow  of goods  over the same  amount,  which  should  result
in little  or no inflationary  pressures.
The sequence  of liability  for the loan  originates  at the purchaser  of the goods. Should  he go
bankrupt,  the commercial  bank has a claim  against  the supplier,  and if he also goes  bankrupt,
the housebank  has to reimburse  the Bundesbank  so that the Bundesbank  essentially  carries  no
rislk 3. As this mode  of financing  is most  often  chosen  wlien  the supplier  is a large  conglomer-
ate, and the client  a rather  small  firm,  also  the  participating  bank  is not confronted  by substantial
risks, but the risk is almost  entirely  borne  by the issuer  of the trade  bills - the supplier.
Hence,  from  an economic  point  of view  it is trade  finance  in the form  of accounts  receivable
(see section  three of this chapter  below),  but with no liquidity  effects. In a perfect  capital
market  liquidity  effects  do not matter,  but the rediscountable  trade bills show  that there is a
demand  for liquidity  in the real world, presumably  for the high shadow  costs  of capital.
The maurity of the trade bills is usually  90 days, but for the involved  bank the period  of
refinancing  is only 90 days minus  the typical  duration  until accounts  receivable  are settled.
After  that,  the purchaser  of the good  would  have  paid from his  line of credit. As  especily  for
small  businesses  the time  between  purchasing  of input  to the time  of seling the finished  good
is not much  longer  than 90 days,  the rediscount  facility  at the Bundesbank  particularly  improves
the liquidity  of banks  lending  to small  businesses.
On top of that,  the interest  rate paid when  handing  the trade  bills to the bank  is the best  rate
available  to small  businesses,  not  counting  ERP  or other  government  funds. The  current  volume
of trade bills rediscounted  at the Bundesbank  lies around  DM 50 billion, which finances  an
annual  trade  flow  in excess  of DM  200  billion. It is not stated,  how  much  of this  volume  serves
23Nevertheless,  the firms that participate  in this  sequence  have to submit  their balance  sheets to the Bundesbuk
for creditworthiness  approval, and the Bundesbank  uses these  balance sheets for its statistics  on Gorm  industry
[141.
25to  finance small businesses, but  interviews confirmed that  medium-sized businesses are
significant  recipients  of this form of finance.
4.2.2.  The refinancing by government banks
It has been mentioned  before that ultimately, the programs of KfW and DAB are not direct
loans to the borrower, but are rather made to the borrower's housebank.  In this sense, KfW
serve to refinance  the banking system, as the lil%ely  alternative to the present system would not
be KfW and DAB lending on their own risk, but the housebank  lending the entire amount. The
loan procedure is such that after the would-be  borrower states his loan demand, and the credit-
worthiness  is established,  the bank looks for possibilities  to refinance  the loan through the KfW
or DAB.
From the published  data it is not apparent, how large is the loan stock to the Mit elstand by
KfW  and DAB, but one can estimate  the numbers from the relative contribution  of the new loans
to the Mittelstand  to the entire volume of new lending.  For the year 1980, the thus deduced
numbers amount to DM 22 billion in the case of KfW, and about DM 4 biilion in the case of
DAB.  Furthermore, the KfW also publishes the relative importance of the different bank
groups.  In the recent years, the share of the cooperative  banks made about 15%, that of the
Sparkassen  about 25%.  From this it follows that lending to cooperatives  in 1980 was likely to
be above DM 3 billion, to Sparkassen  above DM 5 billion. This pales against the approximate
DM 50 billion lending to the Mittelstand  by each of the respective institutions  seen in tables 6
and 7, but it was mentioned  in the discussion  of the tables that the statistic is overrated as it is
likely to include also a number of larger firms.  It is then not unlikely that the loans to the
Mittelst-nd  of cooperative  banks and Sparkassen  combined  are refinanced  up to 15% by the KfW
and the DAB, which is an extent that cannot be overlooked.
The  amount of  refinancing via  rediscountable trade  biUs is  more speculative, but  the
alleviation of  the  liquidity burden  of  financing the  Mittelstand through Sparkassen and
cooperative  banks may well total DM 10 billion, which is another 10%  of their share in lending
to the Mittelstand 26. It is conceivable  that 25% to 30% of loan advances by the small banks
to the Mittelstand  are refinanced  either by the Bundesbank  or by the banks of the federal govem-
ment, which makes it a significant  component  that is completely  independent  of considerations
of a decentralized  money market.
4.2.3.  "Internal"  money markets
The above described  means of official  refinancing  of loan advances  to the Mittelstand  are not
the only way the German banking system has institutionalized  the alleviation of problems
26A reference point may be that cooperative and savings banks excluding their centml institutions had a stock
of DM 23.5 billion  in rediscountable  trade bills in November  1989,  which  amounts  to 30  % of all rediscounted  trade
bills.
Source: Deutsche  Bundesbank  [151
26associated  with rationing small banks out of the interbank market.  Historic;aly, it was surely
a problem that considerations  of creditworthiness  and the then available  infoimation technology
made it impossible  for a significant  interbank market to develop. The means of communication
between small banks in remote parts of the country would most certainly have led to excessive
premia for subjective  risks, and equally likely credit rationing.
The solution that banks had come up with is the establishment  of central institutions  with the
purpose of allocating surplus funds of some smaUl  banks to others with a deficit.  In the case of
the Sparkassen, this task was taken by the Giro institutions, and the cooperatives  had similar
regional centers, with the DG bank being the nationwide  operating bead bank.  The purpose of
this structure is that the small banks do not borrow at all on an interbank market, but allocate
their funds among themselves.  Only the central institutions operate on the money market to
equalize the net deficit or surplus of the system. Hence, the system is a mix between external
market allocation and internally planned allocation of funds.
Historically, the central institutions  of the system of savings  banks (Sparkassen)  originated  to
place  the excess funds  of the individual  savings  banks, which  were mandated  to place their funds
only with prime risks. By contrast,  the central  institutions  of the cooperative  sector were created
to refinance  the individual  cooperative  banks, which by themselves  could not access the capital
markets. Today, as both bank groups have  advanced  to fullfledged  universal  banks, their central
institutions  have become much more alike, and among  other things facilitate  an intemal money
market.
4.2.4.  The decentralization of monitoring bank activity
In the sense of transaction  cost economics,27  the costs associated  with information  gathering
on a potential borrower are transactions  costs, and are potentially  minimized  by changing the
institutional arrangement in which they appear.  Such a case can be made for the task of
monitoring bank activity, and ultimately leads to one explanation  of economies of  scale in
banking.
In a decentralized market, everyone has the responsibility  to monitor everybody  else.  The
social costs of monitoring  can in the sense of transaction  costs economic  be diminished  relative
to the reference point of a decentralized market, when the incentive  of internal monitoring  of
branch activity by the headquarters  of a widely operating bank can be credibly communicated
to the outside world.  For example, Deutsche Bank  has better means of retrieving information
from its branches  and providing  incentives  for prudent  management  to the branch manager, than
an unaffiliated  outsider -even if it is also a bank - would have if the branch was a small and
independent  bank.
27Williamson  1421
27Similar to the banking system fulfilling  a specialist  function to monitor firms' activities, bank
concentration  fulfills a specialist  function of monitoring  the activities of small banking units.
This is, of course, not only relevant in the context of interbank deposits, but also for the bank
supervising agencies, which in  tum are being delegated monitoring responsibilities by  the
community  of depositors, although  indirectly via the electoral-legal  process.  In that sense, the
creation of central institutions for the system of Sparkassen  and cooperative banks serves the
same purpose as a merger process in the banking system,  it is only faster to implement, and the
connection between the  member banks is  somewhat looser in  the  sense that  the  centmal
institutions  don't have the same monitoring  authority  over the member  banks as the headquarters
of a large bank has over the branches in the system. This effect is mirrored in the impressions
received from interviews with bankers that the small cooperative  banks are audited much more
frequently  by the Bundesbankenaufsicht,  the German  bank monitoring  agency, than for example
the big thuee banks.
We have to mention here, why this section is entitled the decentralization  of  monitoring,
although  we are reasoning  for the centralization  of the banking system. In a world of economic
agents limited by their information processing capacity, the depositors have an interest in
delegating monitoring  authority. As the depositors  account for a large share of the population,
this function traditionally  has been performed by the state in a centralized institution, whether
the banking system was rather atomistic  as in the United States, or concentrated  because of a
merger and concentration wave.  By restricting bank concentration, the US has not only
restricted the centralization  of the banking system, but - more important  - has thereby restricted
the decentralization  of bank supervision,  with dismal  consequences  expressible  in large numbers
haunting  the federal budget.
Although proof of such a statement  would be impossible,  this section wants to suggest that
the institutional  arrangements  in the refinancing  mechanisms  of the Sparkassen  and cooperative
banks, which are based on loose cooperation  as well as inserting another layer of monitoring
institutions, at least historically led to more efficient means of refinancing small banks.  The
creation of central institutions  of the small banks, which make an internal money market, was
an efficient attempt to adapt to the environment of a system of many small banks that had
developed  in the 19th century.
With the means of data processing  available  today, the evolution  will likely tend towards more
market, and the first development  is already visible in the abandonment  of the regional middle
layer in the system of cooperative  banks.  Historically, however, we would like to make a case
that the reliance on internal capital markets certainly increased the effectiveness  of the small
banks, and with that also the financing  of small businesses.  Still tuday, the small cooperative
banks and the savings  institutions  are financed solely by deposits, the Bundesbank's  rediscount
facilities, the government's banks, and loans from their central institutions.  They do not
participate in the money market.
284.3. Trade credit, and trade  credit insurance
Trade credit is a prominent means of obtaining financing  in German industry.  Bundesbank
data show that in the 1980s, the level of accounts receivable on firms' balance sheet totalled
around DM 300 billion, which is slightly larger than the total of short-term credit of banks to
industry.
Concentrating  on the liability side of the balance sheet, it becomes  clear that trade finance is
more important for small firms than for larger ones.  Although such data are not precisely
available, one can use legal incorporation  as a proxy for size, for which  data are available. The
"Kapitalgesellschaften"  (AG, GmbH) account for about 30% of accounts  payable in the 1970s
against their share of about 47% of domestic revenues 2 ', while the sole proprietors account for
25% of accounts  payable against their share of 16% of domestic revenues.
A large extent of trade finance in an economy is often viewed as a sign of an inefficient
banking system, as trade credit is expensive, and banks could make easy profits substituting
trade credit for lines of credit, i.e. instead of the supplier taking the risk and charging a lot of
money, the banks could absorb the risks more efficiently and hence at a  cheaper price.
Obviously,  the price of trade credit depends on the time between the date where the full price
is charged, and the date until the bill is finally settled without interest charge.  It is not an
uncommon  practice that this duration may be as long as two, sometimes  three month3,  in which
case the cost of trade credit lies only between 8% and 12%.
An interesting  issue is the role of trade credit insurance  companies, because they absorb the
credit risk, but obviously without  providing the supplier with liquidity, which would happen  in
case of a line of credit for the purchaser, in  which case the bank would also provide the
liquidity. For one thing this illustrates  that in an environment  with credit rationing  and predomi-
nantly collateral  lending, the shadow  cost of capital is much larger than the stated interest rate.
However, the market leader in trade credit insurance - Hermes Kreditversicherungs  AG with
not quite 50% market share - reported DM 300 million in insurance premia on DM 85 billion
total coverage limit 2' in  1988.  With an actual usage rate of the credit limit of about 30%
(estimated  by a representative  of the industry), this leads to a de facto risk premium of only 1  %,
and it is not clear, why banks do not compete more aggressively  by opening lines of credit that
25Source:  Table 3 and Deutsche  Bundesbank 141.  The Bundesbank  data are collected  from the firms' balance
sheets, which show their state as of December 31st of a given year. As a lot of firms increase their prices as of
Jsnuay  Ist, it is not uncommon  for firms to increase their inventory  in the month of December  at the old prices,
and ear  an additional  spread due to the expected  price increase  at the turn of the year. As the discount  given for
timely  payment  is often valid for 30 days, this means  that firms may not have relied on trade finance although  their
balance  sheets suggested  such. Hence, balance  sheet  data overestimate  the extent of trade finance.
29See  Hermes Kreditversicherngs AG [24,p.16-17)
29can be made cheaper than 1  % below the interest cost of trade credit, given that the actual loss
experience of Hermes was averaging about 40% of insurance premia.
Furthermore, one has to consider that the cost of trade credit insurance is charged to the
supplier, which makes it a part of his pricing policy, and the purchaser ultimately  pays for his
own credit risk.  The relocation of trade financing  in terms of liquidity and credit risk from
suppliers and trade credit insurers to banks opening lines of credit could lead to greater price
transparency, ultimately  benefitting  the consumer.
The theoretical  reasons for the efficiency of the regime with trade credit insurers rather than
bank finance lie in a different area.  The supplier can be assumed to have an infornational
advantage  concerning  the purchaser  over both banks and trade credit insurers, especially  as trade
credit insurance is most often used for clients with which the supplier has long-term business
relations with. The trade credit insurer  can use this informational  advantage  by writing  incentive
compatible  contracts  and insuring  only a fraction  of the potential  loss, which is actually  the case.
This option is not available to a bank giving a line of credit, which bears automatically 100%
of the credit risk so that the potential  abuse of bank administered  trade credit is larger than in
a regime with trade credit insurance.
Therefore, it is questionable,  whether  banks could secure profitable business  away from trade
credit insurers. However, as according to a representative  of the trade credit insurance industry
oniy about 1/4 to 1/3 of all trade credits are insured, banks could arguably secure profitable
business by tapping the market of uninsured trade credit shifting risk from suppliers to the
banldng system.  However, the obvious problem with this scenario is that the bank cannot
distinguish between the two cases, which ultimately makes it impossible to reason that the
banking system is inefficient  because of the extent of trade credit circulating in the economy.
30S. Summary and Fial  Analysis
This essay tried to describe the  nature of financing smaller firms in  Germany, and the
involvement  of the banking system.  The first objective  of the paper was to demonstrate that
banks have no institutionalized  means of controlling small firms, and that these firms represent
a significant  share of the economy. Thus, the generally  prevailing  cliche about Gennan banking
is not applicable  in their relation to small firms.  Secondly, the essay means to have shown that
there are two important ways  how the rationing  of credit to small firms  is avoided in the German
system.
First,  the government takes a very active role to support entrepreneurs directly through
subsidies, loans from banks of the federal government, or subsidized credit insurance.  The
important thing to note here is that the government  programs in no way try to direct the flow
of investments  to preferred industries  as would be the case in planned economies, but that the
selection of the recipient of the funds is still left to market forces, here the banking system.
Secondly, small firms are historically  financed by small banks.  It has been shown that these
banks themselves had  to  overcome a  problem of  credit  rationing, which had led  to  the
development  of centralized institutions  in the systems  of cooperative  and savings banks.  These
create an internal money market not unlike that within a large bank.  Furthermore, the small
banks can exploit other non-market refinancing  instruments  such as rediscountable  trade-bills,
or the loans from the banks of the federal government,  which  are predominantly  used to finance
smaller firms.  Refinancing  the small banks with non-market means has helped in the past to
overcome a credit rationing problem of the smaller banks.  Whether there exist economic
reasons still today that make it more efficient for small firms to be financed by small banks
rather than branches of the big banks is not clear.
An assessment of  the banking system has to put  it into perspective with its economic
environment.  Despite the lack of institutionalized  control mechanisms,  also the relationships
with the smaller firms are to be characterized as house-bank relationships, which tend to be
long-term. A prerequisite  of long-term relationships  is the extreme monetary stability that was
enjoyed in Post-war Germany,  which only made possible  the long-term fixed interest lending as
for example by the KfW and DAB to the "Mittelstand". Restrictive  legislation  or looser central
bank policy would arguably  prevent the system of long-run  financial  relationships  from having
a chance at a test in the marL-etplace.
The govemment's attitude towards entrepreneurship  deserves further credit.  Eliminating
financial  market imperfections  as a barrier to entry for small entrepreneurs  strengthens  the entire
economy, as  it allows the  large firms to  contract out various economic functions that a
competitive  market of atomistic firms can take better care of.  Especially  the experience of the
financing of  small firms seems to  be relevant for policy recommendations  in  developing
countries.
31A number of  developing countries can be characterized as  having a  rather concentrated
industrial structure, and there is  more significant involvement of  the governments in  the
economies, which are more geared to controlling the flow of investments. This essay meant to
have given an example of public sector options to efficiently  unleash the productive  potential  of
the private sector. In Germany, a lot was achieved  by the government  providing  liquidity, while
the banks of the private sector bear the risk and are compensated  for it.  This way, a market
inefficiency  is overcome at the samc time avoiding  the mistakes  of centralized administration.
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